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Colombia es una nacion de cosas muy singulares; 
Los civiles dan la guerra, y lapaz los militares.1 
Viewed from a historical perspective, the years 1948-1965 in Colombia, 
known as La Violencia, resulted from a combination of many factors: 
ideology (conservatives, liberals, communists, Catholics, Protestants), 
geography (rural areas, urban areas, prosperous areas, poor areas, mountainous 
areas, flatlands), economy (wealthy elites, poor peasantry, prosperous small 
farmers, bandits). Each of these provided motivation to different groups. 
Ideological guerrillas fought because radical or minority groups were excluded 
first from partisan participation and later from the Frente Nacional; liberal and 
conservative bands fought for revenge, greed or tradition; violentos2 spread 
violence for economic gain; Catholics fought Protestants for influence over 
the population. All these factors coincided during La Violencia to produce a 
brand of terrorism that, if not new to the world, was at least unique in Latin 
America.3 
In the early 1900s, Colombian politics were to some extent based on the 
spoils system. The enfranchised voted into power a president and a political 
party (the predominant parties have always been Liberales or Conservadores), 
who then appointed all other officials in the government, from cabinet 
members down to local policemen. In addition, the powerful oligarchies had 
developed a political system that allowed them to share power with little 
interference from the popular masses, while keeping intact conventional 
democratic procedures.4 But in the early 1930s, liberal President Alfonso 
Lopez introduced drastic reforms to the Colombian government: he expanded 
the electorate, started land reform, protected labor movements, inaugurated a 
progressive income tax system, and passed laws to separate the Catholic 
Church from the secular government. These reforms came at a time of 
tremendous growth and prosperity. As a result of both these conditions, the 
stakes involved in subsequent elections rose dramatically. The spoils no 
longer involved just the partitioning of a few government offices in Bogota 
and ambassadorships abroad: entire bureaucracies were created to control 
business, taxation, customhouses, social services, the armed forces. In short, 
the liberals created a bureaucracy for anything they thought the government 
could or should control. Given the attitude toward the government held by the 
typical official (that the office was there to create personal wealth), these 
reforms were significant. A career in die government seemed more lucrative 
and profitable. 
Due to a split among the liberals, the conservatives won the 1946 
election. When the results were announced, the conservatives were elated, and 
immediately took to the streets in celebration. Smarting from many years of 
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"liberal oppression," they also began persecuting the liberals, claiming their 
reforms^siibverted the nation. But a generalized type of violence did not begin 
then, though sporadic street fighting did erupt in the departments surrounding 
Bogota. La Violencia proper was sparked by the murder of the populist 
(liberal) leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948. Liberals throughout the entire 
nation then took to arms, fearing a general massacre within their ranks. 
Because so many of the policemen (from the ranks of the liberals) joined in 
the rampage, the armed forces were called in to put a stop to the violence in 
the Bogota.5 But the revolt spread to towns and villages throughout central 
and south Colombia. Knowing that judges would never convict fellow party 
members for crimes of revenge against the opposition, looting of stores and 
farms throughout Colombia became common. This generalized rural violence 
cost Colombia close to 200,000 lives, took over twenty years to resolve, and 
left a legacy that has not yet been eradicated. 
The Time Periods of La Violencia 
Although the dates assigned differ somewhat, most students of this 
episode in Colombia's history agree that the twenty years of La Violencia can 
be divided into several distinct periods. Russell Ramsey, for example, divided 
the era into four distinct periods.6 Phase I began with the rise of the 
conservatives to power in 1946. The conservatives sought revenge for the 
strong-arm tactics the liberals had used while instituting their liberal reforms. 
The fighting was limited to the rural areas in Santander, Norte de Santander, 
Boyaca, and Cundinamarca. 
Phase II began when an insane man assassinated liberal leader Jorge 
Eliecer Gaitan in Bogata in April of 1948. In retaliation, liberal and 
communist groups took up arms against the conservatives, looting and 
rioting in the streets of Bogota. Prisons were opened, and the police refused to 
obey government orders and calls for peace. Many policemen, in fact, joined 
the rebels wholeheartedly. The freed criminals, many of them jailed for 
political reasons, banded together with other rebels to form the core of the 
cuadrillas.7 They operated mainly in the Llanos Orientales, the eastern plains, 
but eventually moved into Boyaca, Meta, Antioquia, Cundinamarca, and 
Tolima. The fighting reached a peak in 1952, with approximately 26,000 
liberals opposing the (neutral) armed forces and conservative police 
departments. 
Phase III of La Violencia was a reaction to the rule of General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla, who was asked by a bipartisan group of civilians to take over 
because of popular discontent with the government of Laureano Gomez and 
its inability to separate the warring parties. After consulting with top military 
advisors, Rojas Pinilla uttered the famous words "Asumo el mando de la 
nation."* He then attempted to convert military neutralism into an apolitical 
military government, with moderate success. He instituted several liberal 
reforms (social services, mostly), negotiated a general amnesty for all 
guerrillas, and militarized the police forces. To this day, the Colombian 
police force retains its military structure, with rank and pay equal to that of 
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the armed forces. Fortunately, the military (and the new police force) were 
able to remain politically neutral. There were isolated individual cases of 
corruption, but these were the exception rather than the rule. Partisan politics, 
however, did not stop in the civilian ranks, and the military was forced to 
become involved in the fight to separate the warring parties. 
By 1958, when the military turned over the government to the new 
Frente Nacional (National Front), the fighting had become deeply 
institutionalized banditry. This began Phase IV: the armed forces once again 
separated the two hostile factions. By the early 1960s, it succeeded: most of 
the violence was no longer politically motivated, as mere was a unanimous 
consensus not only within the government but also among the populace that 
the time to control the situation had arrived. By 1965 the armed forces had 
done just that, by isolating the fighting groups. The government also 
undercut the reasons for political unrest by putting into practice many social 
reforms in the regions affected by the violence.9 
Geography Of La Violencia 
The majority of Colombia's population lives in the central highlands. 
The three cordilleras (ranges) forming the Andes Mountains create two long 
valleys running on a north-south axis through the western half of Colombia. 
In these valleys, and in the small valleys within the ranges themselves, are 
the fertile farmlands that provide work and food for a large portion of 
Colombia's population. Contrary to the popular theory that rebellion and 
violence are endemic to the poorer sections of a population, La Violencia was 
fiercest in these relatively prosperous valleys. 
Though the violence that began during the Bogotazo in 1948 reached 
most of Colombia, it quickly settled into the central regions. In the areas 
covered by the departments of Tolima, Caldas, Valle, and parts of 
Cundinamarca, the bandits used the rough terrain to their advantage, forcing 
the police and armed forces to rely on transportation accessible to both sides. 
In other words, airplanes, helicopters, and self-propelled guns could not be 
used successfully in the mountains. The army was forced to use horses, 
burros, and rifles, the same equipment used by the violentos. 
By the early 1960s, however, the military gained control, forcing the 
bandits to relocate to the eastern plains. There they were quickly conquered, 
because the military could press its technological advantage, and because the 
bandits were unaccustomed to fighting without the cover of mountains. Some 
of the larger groups (the internationally funded communist cuadrillas) entered 
the cities, though not very successfully. 
The Terrorists 
From the beginning, but predominantly toward the end of La Violencia, 
several non-politically motivated groups emerged. These were criminals 
taking advantage of the general lawlessness to enrich themselves. They tended 
to remain in smaller gangs, and operated principally as bandits and highway 
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robbers. Some imitated the political cuadrillas, demanding "taxes" or 
protection money from wealthy landowners. But, lacking the logistical 
support and numbers available to the political groups, they were not as 
successful in these types of fund-raising. They were perhaps more difficult for 
the military to conquer, because they tended to form small cliques and were 
more difficult to infiltrate than the political cuadrillas. The leaders trusted few 
individuals, and perhaps lacked trust completely, even within their band. 
These groups were an obvious result of a volatile political and economic 
history, products of their times. 
Many studies have been written about the terrorists themselves, though 
there is little consensus regarding what exactly constituted a violento.™ Only 
four things were common to the violentos: they were all young, they all took 
on nicknames, the cuadrillas were individually localized and protected their 
"turf" from other cuadrillas, and they all used rather macabre methods to kill 
their victims. 
The first feature the violentos had in common was their youth. There 
were exceptions, of course, but ages of between 14 and 22 years was the 
norm.11 The use of nicknames is relatively simple to understand: they masked 
the violentos' identity. By using a nickname and a disguise, a peasant could 
perpetrate his crimes and then go home to his farm chores. He could thus 
hope to escape identification and possible conviction. As he committed more 
crimes without detection, a good nickname could help propagate fear or fame, 
depending on the notoriety of his actions. A liberal bandit harassing 
conservatives successfully could become quite a legend among other liberals, 
and his fame enlist both aid and recruits, if needed. All terrorists used 
nicknames, though not all became famous: successful banditry resulted from 
good organization and sufficient funding, not from using a good nickname. 
But for the most part, the bandits who succeeded in gaining fame also had 
catchy nicknames. Almost all used either a descriptive or an animal 
nickname. Examples of notorious violentos include: Manuel Marulanda 
Velez-Tiro/io (Sure Shot), Teofilo Rojas Vaion-Chispas (Sparks), Jose 
William Angel Aranguren-Dcy^m'fe (Vindication), and Medardo Trejos-
Capitan Venganza (Captain Revenge). Perhaps equally vile, but certainly not 
as notorious were: Avispa (Wasp), Agustin Bonilla-fi/ Diablo (The Devil), 
Grillo Marin (Cricket), Manuel Cedeno-£/ Mico (The Monkey), and Pastillas 
(Pills). 
For the most part, the bandits remained within a localized area of 
operations, seldom straying from their claimed "turfs." The area covered by a 
turf varied with the size of the cuadrilla: some only included one or two 
villages and the outlying farms, while others, such as that of Capitan 
Venganza, included almost an entire Department (the Quindio region of 
Caldas). Each cuadrilla ruled its region as it saw fit, and this, of course, varied 
with the personality of the leader. Bandits such as Zarpazo (Conrado Salazar) 
preferred extortion as the method of collecting taxes, killing and taking over 
the farms of those who refused. Others, such as Pedro Brincos (Roberto 
Gonzalez Prieto), proclaiming their aim was a communist state in Colombia, 
relied on bank robberies and forced loans from businessmen. There were a few 
8 
Conflict Quarterly 
exceptional cases, such as that of Captain Venganza (Medardo Terjos), who 
established a government on their turf, complete with taxation, judicial 
courts, and police forces.12 
Enforcement varied as much as the method of rule, but generally it 
followed the same pattern: the better the organization, the less the violence. 
Capitan Venganza was no less macabre than other violentos, but he was more 
predictable, and resorted less often to violence. His rule was apparently quite 
popular, and tolerated by both the populace and the national government, if 
only because the region remained relatively peaceful-and inaccessible to the 
army and police forces. But discipline was harsh: his second in command, 
Sargento Garcia, and another subordinate, El Ovejo, were executed for 
insubordination. One had refused to carry out an order, and the other had killed 
a government agent without Venganza's approval. 
Other bandits were much more savage. Perhaps it was the traditional 
emotionalism involved in national and partisan politics that inspired such 
violence. Whatever the reason, bandits took great pride in developing and 
naming new methods of killing their victims. The Corte de Franela was quite 
popular: it consisted of cutting the victim's throat by starting at the chin and 
removing the skin clear to both collarbones. The Corte Corbata (necktie cut) 
consisted of opening a hole in the larynx and pulling the victim's tongue out 
through the hole to hang there like a necktie. The Corte de Mico (monkey 
cut) consisted of beheading the victim and then tying the hair tightly in a 
knot at the back of the head, contorting the face into a toothy grin like that of 
a spider monkey. All these "popular cuts" were performed with either 
machetes or small knives: this, of course, meant the violento was in direct 
contact with his victim. Such violence is indicative of the emotionalism and 
sensationalism caused by the style of power politics of the pre-Violencia 
period in Colombia's history. That this type of crime also spread fear and 
promoted cooperation or prompt response to a bandit's demands is readily 
understood. 
ANALYSIS OF LA VIOLENCIA 
La Violencia produced a unique phenomenon of terror. The type of 
terrorism prevalent from 1948-1965 in Colombia violated all current notions 
of what constitutes terrorism and guerrilla warfare, in that: 
It was partisan, but not organized. 
It was rural, seldom urban. 
It was seldom anti-establishment, but was sometimes 
encouraged by the establishment 
It was not against a dictatorship, but it created a 
dictatorship. 
It was not religiously oriented. 
It was not among the poor, but rather predominantly among 
the prosperous small farmers. 
It was not against the armed forces, but was finally 
controlled by the armed forces. 
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It actually spawned a political solution to Colombia's 
political difficulties. 
These criteria present an interesting situation in the attempt to define 
terrorism and violence in Latin America. La Violencia does not fit many of 
the normal definitions or parameters of terrorism or of revolt or revolution. 
La Violencia, as an anomaly in the history of terrorism, must be studied 
within its own context 
Partisan, Not Organized 
La Violencia was a partisan phenomena, but not an organized one. At 
first glance, this condition apparently deviates from "standard" terrorism, but 
in reality it does not. For a vast majority of the population, Colombian 
politics before 1948 was of the armchair variety. Because of the relatively 
small size and importance of the national government in Bogota, most people 
thought that it mattered little what they thought or voted for. The affairs of 
state could be watched by anyone, but only a privileged few could participate. 
Only on the local level did politics become useful, because on this level 
participation was at least possible. Individual political affiliation was 
generally hereditary and geographical, rather than ideological. Whether the 
terms conservative or liberal meant anything political to individuals was 
irrelevant adherence to the family party was very relevant. 
Political persuasion, in other words, was not an individual decision. 
Party affiliation was a badge of honor, to be upheld as strongly as the family 
name, regardless of whether the adherent knew the meaning of the terms 
conservative or liberal. Using this definition, politics was intertwined with 
the individual ego: one would never call a fellow conservative a liberal 
without fear of violent, and sometimes fatal, reprisals. 
From this viewpoint, that battle-lines were drawn along political lines 
was not surprising. But the political leaders were not necessarily involved in 
the violence, and certainly did not take part in an official capacity. Officials 
participated to be sure, but on a personal level, and most probably because of 
greed or because a family member or friend had become the victim of a crime 
or their personal honor and position had been threatened. The elites were 
involved more on an intellectual level than on the action level,13 but because 
all government positions were appointed by the party in power, it became 
easy for a person assuming office to seek "reparations" for all actions taken 
under the previous regime. 
Rural, Not Urban 
La Violencia was a rural phenomena, seldom an urban one. The initial 
strike was in Bogota, but it only lasted a short time. The army quickly 
contained the rioting, and prevented it altogether in other cities. But the rural 
areas of Colombia were not to be controlled so easily. The liberals, in power 
during the reform years, had revelled in their new importance and power. 
Conservative farmers had been harassed and run off their lands so liberal 
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farmers could take over. Police officers and judges were appointed by the 
liberal party in Bogota, who adhered to strict partisan guidelines. The harassed 
conservative victims could not expect justice from liberal magistrates, and 
this was particularly true if the perpetrator was a known liberal. The 
prosperity that had allowed the liberal reforms to take place had also given 
rise to a class of small coffee-growing landowners. This was the class 
involved in the conflict-there was no real counterpart to this sort in the cities. 
When the conservatives assumed power in 1946, they immediately 
replaced the liberal officials. Once firmly in control, they sought "reparations" 
for the sixteen years of "liberal oppression." In other words, the liberals 
received a taste of their own medicine: conservative farmers returned to 
reclaim their farms. Because the land and property in question had usually 
been taken forcibly, the returning owners felt no compunction to use any 
other means. Though this type of property transfer was not wholesale, it did 
contribute to an escalation in the cycle of crime and lawlessness. 
Seldom Anti-Establishment 
La Violencia was seldom anti-establishment, and, at times, the 
establishment encouraged it. This aspect of the period is one that makes La 
Violencia unique in the history of terrorism. The two political parties created 
an environment in which resorting to violence was a simple and viable 
solution to long-standing grievances. That the establishment-the two 
political parties-at first encouraged the criminal behavior and allowed 
corruption to flourish is seldom questioned. Very shortly after the 
assassination of Gaitan, however, the parties quickly distances themselves 
from terrorism, and condemned the violence caused in their names. But their 
condemnation came too late to stop the momentum of the warring parties. 
Thus the Colombian political tradition, in essence, provided an environment 
in which terrorism flourished: local power politics-power through the use of 
violence-was possible, and even encouraged. Individuals in the system took 
full advantage of their positions, and used the unrest to further their individual 
ambitions. Thus, while the political parties condemned La Violencia, its 
members encouraged and even revelled in iL 
While it is true that individuals encouraged the violence, crimes were 
committed not against the opposing political party or the government in 
general, but rather against individuals. Traditionally liberal peasants were 
forced off their farms by traditionally conservative peasants or gangs in 
predominantly conservative regions. The opposite was true in predominantly 
liberal regions. Local minority party members were at grave risk of being 
either forced off their farms or killed if they refused to leave. While the 
terrorism was politically motivated, it was not at all anti-establishment. The 
peasants simply took advantage of a political tradition created by the 
establishment, to further their individual ambitions, be they political, 
economic, or simply emotional. 
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Not Anti-Dictatorship 
If La Violencia was not anti-establishment, then, it was also not against 
a dictatorship. In fact, it created one of the few dictatorships Colombia has 
ever experienced. General Rojas Pinilla's rise to power resulted from the 
inability of the political parties to control their members and bring about a 
cessation to the hostilities. A military leader-not the military as a unit-was 
then asked by a bipartisan group of leaders to intervene, hoping he could 
create a new, non-partisan government and thus solve the political problems 
causing the violence. The traditional role of the military as the "savior of the 
nation" was invoked, and Rojas Pinilla was asked to assume power. But he 
could not create such a solution, being too conservative for the liberals, and 
too liberal for the conservatives. He did not dismantle the liberal reforms, and 
did not further them, either: instead, he (unsuccessfully) attempted to establish 
a sort of "benevolent dictatorship." Eventually partisan politics proved too 
strong for even the civilian leaders. They united in a demand for Rojas 
Pinilla's resignation, which they received. 
Rojas Pinilla did start a process potentially able to control the violence. 
In 1953 he offered anyone involved in political crime an unconditional 
amnesty: violentos were encouraged to turn in their weapons in exchange for 
a full and free pardon. This amnesty program was only temporarily 
successful, though. Many groups had already developed intense rivalries with 
other cuadrillas, and used the cease-fire process to further entrench and prepare 
for the renewal of hostilities. Rojas Pinilla then increased the scope and 
intensity of the role played by the armed forces. From this role came the 
saying mentioned under the title: the armed forces separated the warring 
factions and thus stopped the violence. Partisan politics, the realm of the 
civilians, had caused and continued the war: the armed forces, usually charged 
with waging war, had to intervene to keep the peace. And the armed forces' 
success at separating and isolating the combatants finally brought an end to 
La Violencia in the mid-1960s.14 
Not Religiously Oriented 
La Violencia was not a religious conflict, though violence was 
sometimes encouraged by the Catholic Church, when carried out against 
Protestants. Here, as in the political arena, individuals (Catholic priests and 
bishops) fomented violence for their personal ambitions (and to eliminate 
Protestants). In many cases, atrocities and persecution against Protestants did 
occur, but not necessarily because of religion. Protestants tended to be 
liberals, and crimes against them tended to be politically motivated. 
There was, however, a significant amount of religious persecution. 
Incited by Catholic priests, many cases of discrimination occurred: couples 
were refused marriage licences without the priest's consent; patients were not 
cared for in hospitals without first attending a Catholic confessional; police 
confiscated Bibles and interrupted Protestant religious services. This pattern 
conformed to the religious traditions of Colombia. Orlando Fals-Borda, one of 
the first to analyze La Violencia, pointed out that "religion means principally 
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to meet the requirements of the Church and to follow the dictates of the 
priests-a devotion to the Church as an institution rather than to Christianity 
as a way of life"15 Allegiance to the Church simply meant following the 
priest's or the bishop's directives, not participation in a set of religious 
traditions or doctrine. Catholic priests were for the most part conservatives, 
and thus exhorted their followers to conform to conservative ideals. If that 
meant killing (Protestant) liberals, so much the better. 
The Concordat of 1887 (signed by the religious and political leaders of 
Colombia) declared Roman Catholicism the official religion of Colombia.16 
The Catholic Church was loath to give up any of this prestige and power to 
Protestant churches, and several zealous individuals within the Church did 
exploit the situation to their advantage. The general population would not 
contradict Catholic priests, and violence had become an accepted way of life in 
many rural areas. That priests resorted to terrorism came as a surprise to no 
one: Protestants, for their part, were working to demote the Catholic Church 
from its official position. While not anti-Catholic, the liberal political party 
was to a great extent anti-clerical, and viewed religion as an individual issue. 
That such a position could reduce the political power of the Catholic Church 
no doubt crossed more than one liberal's mind. Catholic leaders knew this, 
and were quick to associate Protestants with liberals: killing a Protestant was 
equated with killing a liberal. Thus La Violencia could not be categorized as 
having strictly religious overtones: everything was couched in terms of 
partisan politics. Once again, the violence was not the work of an 
organization, but rather of many individuals taking advantage of a situation 
created by the political traditions of the nation. 
Not Among the Poor 
Another characteristic of La Violencia was its predominance among the 
prosperous small farmers, rather than among the poor. Colombia is divided 
ethnically, culturally, climatically, and traditionally into five distinct 
regions.17 La Violencia affected primarily only one of these, the Andean 
region, where the prosperous farmers were located, where approximately 70% 
of the nation's economy and population were located. The poorer areas of 
Colombia, such as the states bordering on the Caribbean, Pacific, or those in 
the far south were, if not exempt, at least spared the worst of the violence. 
Costenos (inhabitants of the coasts), for example, were traditionally opposed 
to violence: highlanders still consider them unambitious.18 Other regions also 
escaped the turmoil for similar reasons. 
The problem began when the liberal party increased governmental 
control over the nation's economy: wealth and a centrally planned economy 
became the basis of the conflict.19 From this viewpoint, it is readily 
understandable why the poorer areas of the nation were spared the worst 
manifestations of the unrest. Areas with access to a world market and its 
promises of prosperity, such as Tolima, where much of Colombia's coffee 
was grown, or Antioquia, the center for textile manufacturing and industrial 
capital of Colombia, were hit hard by the terrorism and its effects. 
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Colombia's wealth came primarily from its fertile farmlands. Thus, it is easy 
to understand why the conflict affected rural areas such as Tolima, and not the 
large cities. Land was the basis of wealth, and the struggle for control of the 
land was one of the major characterizations of La Violencia. Under this 
interpretation, peasant farmers were not necessarily forced off their properties 
because they were liberals or conservatives, but because other landowners 
resorted to crime to obtain their land. The fact that only farms owned by 
minority political adherents were taken over was not irrelevant, but it was not 
necessarily the deciding factor. In like manner, extortion and hostage-taking 
was prevalent only in the prosperous areas of Colombia. Wealth was the 
deciding factor.20 
Not Against The Armed Forces 
Another peculiar aspect of La Violencia was the role of the armed forces. 
As mentioned earlier, die conflict was not against the government, nor was it 
against the armed forces. But the armed forces did finally control the violence: 
they broke up the major cuadrillas and drove the remaining insurgents into a 
terrain so unfamiliar that defeating them became easier. The armed forces were 
much larger, better organized, and better equipped than the insurgents. The 
army was thus able to coordinate efforts over areas larger than the domain of 
any one rebel cuadrilla, isolating and defeating diem one by one. 
One of the anomalies of La Violencia was the relationship between the 
armed forces and the government. All governments in Latin America are 
praetorian to a certain degree: the military is the power behind the scenes. 
Traditionally, the military is seen as the "savior of the nation": when civilian 
governments cannot control events or manage a situation, the military is 
called on to restore order. The military is usually die only institution with an 
infrastructure disciplined enough to maintain control. When enemies threaten, 
either from within or from without, the army is responsible for repelling that 
threat. In the case of Colombia, die armed forces were called upon to do 
something about La Violencia when die political parties could no longer 
control die insurgents. As a result of Ulis tradition, die military could accept 
its role as me "savior of the nation" widiout compromising its professional 
standards.21 Domestic security is, if not the principal mission, at least a 
corollary mission of the Colombian armed forces, and political turmoil is 
considered a threat to die nation's security. During La Violencia this threat 
was very real. 
It may be argued Üiat Ulis is still a form of praetorianism. There is no 
denying it, if only because of die definition placed on die professional status 
of the military. If professionalism means that die military can only act 
against an external threat, and any involvement in a conflict (political or 
oüierwise) witiiin the country is defined as intervention, dien die Colombian 
military did violate its standards. But if the military's mission consists of not 
only meeting external threats, but also internal subversive threats, then 
praetorianism is acceptable. The Colombian military consistently maintained 
a professional attitude Üiroughout La Violencia. It did not usurp die power of 
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the government, and resisted the temptation to support one party against the 
other. 
Accusations of partiality abounded (and still abound), of course, but the 
nature of those accusations varied with the location of the supposed infraction 
and the particular bias of the accuser. Were the army to enter a predominantly 
liberal region and attack a conservative rebel, other conservatives in the area 
would accuse the military of backing the liberals. The opposite would also be 
true. So the military realized from the start that either way accusations would 
be thrown, and maintained as impartial an attitude as possible. After the 
government recognized this, and lent its support to the counterinsurgency 
mission the armed forces assumed, a solution was finally in sight. 
La Violencia Spawned a Political Solution 
Surprisingly, given the volatile nature of the era, La Violencia actually 
spawned a political solution to Colombia's political difficulties. Unable to 
control the violence, the political parties recognized that their political 
system, a system based on the spoils of office, had created the situation. As 
the crime wave increased, the party leadership decided that compromise was 
preferable to death, and after much arguing and negotiating, they reached a 
solution. In 1958, the two parties formed the Frente Nacional, agreeing to 
share power equally for a period of 16 years. During this time they were the 
only two political parties permitted by law. Minority groups were forced to 
either function only as splinter groups or go underground to evade the power 
of the coalition. The two major parties agreed to share all governmental 
power, and to alternate the presidency during four terms of four years each. 
General elections would no longer choose the political party to name a 
president: they became primaries, essentially, held to elect presidential 
candidates only. The party whose turn it was to appoint the president would 
do so based on the election results. 
Colombian politics, in essence, became boring. Party allegiance lost its 
tremendous pull, because it no longer mattered: if one party was not in 
power, within four years it was guaranteed the control of the government. The 
Frente Nacional only allowed for two parties to share power, so third parties 
(usually splinter groups) vied for marginal participation. Leftist or 
communist parties had literally no power at all. With the introduction of 
boredom and predictability into politics, the violence quickly diminished. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Frente Nacional emerged as a workable solution, a majority of 
the peasants involved in political crime accepted the second amnesty proposal 
(1958). Only the hardened violentos and ideologically motivated insurgents 
stayed in the hills. There were several reasons for their refusal to join the new 
political system. The ideological insurgents had by this time become so 
distanced from the political reality of Colombia that they adhered to Marxist 
communism or other radical doctrines. This group of violentos had no real 
alternative: either they took over the government by force or they admitted 
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their cause was hopeless and quit. Few were willing to choose the latter, and 
with a steady income and support from Castro in Cuba, other leftist groups, 
extortion, and robberies, they remained in their cuadrillas. Many of them 
acknowledged and solicited aid from international terrorist groups, communist 
nations, and more recently, narcotics smugglers. Because of this support 
some cuadrillas have survived until current times.22 
Colombia is a land of contrasts. It has traditionally been fiscally 
conservative, maintained a stable economy, enjoyed relative wealth and 
prosperity, and maintained a tradition of political, democratic pluralism. 
Despite all this, Colombia has suffered from a type of violence unprecedented 
and unique in the history of Latin America. This violence was characterized 
by radical ideological guerrilla warfare, violence marked by sadism, and 
anarchy in geographical and social areas usually inaccessible to most 
terrorists, namely, the prosperous rural regions. This violence was unique 
because individuals were responsible for the violence, not the government or 
its opponents. Political traditions and an unstable system of democracy set 
the stage for the violence: individuals, both within the government and in the 
general populace, took advantage of that instability. Crimes begat crimes of 
revenge, sparking a vicious cycle that took twenty years to stop. Through a 
combination of social reforms, infiltration, and force, the Colombian armed 
forces were finally able to isolate the hostile factions. The civilian 
government, through a combination of amnesty programs and finally, a 
liberalization of national politics, was able to regain control of the situation, 
and bring about an end to La Violencia. 
But the legacy of violence continues: terrorism has not left the political 
arena of Colombia. Political discontent, supported by international groups 
and foreign governments, has kept alive the traditional resort to violence. In 
this type of environment, it is not surprising that the cycle of violence should 
continue. Lawlessness and banditry for economic gain has once more joined 
the political rebellion. The stakes are higher this time, however, and make a 
resolution much harder to achieve. 
In the early 1960s the Colombian armed forces broke up the rebel groups 
through the use of better equipment, intelligence, logistical support, and the 
support of a unified political front. But the new generation of rebels, backed 
by money from the drug cartels, now have the finances to successfully 
compete with the armed forces, and ignore or threaten the political players. 
This makes the government's task of coping with the new cycle of violence 
much more difficult. Amnesty offers have not worked as well as in the 1950s, 
and political reorganization will not solve the crisis either. The new (drug-
related) violence is not an isolated, indigenous problem. Its sources are 
international and will require international cooperation to eradicate. 
Compromise between the governmental leaders worked in the 1950s. What 
compromise will work in the 1980s and 1990s remains to be seen. 
Colombia's troubles are no longer an anomaly in terrorism, as they were 
during La Violencia. 
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Colombia is a nation of very unique things; the civilians wage war, and peace, the 
military-Colombian saying. 
Bandits and guerrillas who took part in La Violencia were called violentos (violent 
ones). 
3
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These five regions consist of the following: the Andes (Tolima, Huila, Quindio, Cal das, 
Cundinamarca, Antioquia, Santander, Santander del Norte); the Atlantic Coast (Bolivar, 
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Cordoba, Atlantico, Magdalena, Cesar, Sucre, Guajira); the Eastern Plains (Meta, 
Arauca, Boyaca, Guaviare, Casanare, Vichada, Vaupes, Guainia); the South (the 
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For a very readable, if slightly biased, account of the role of the Colombian armed 
forces during La Violencia, see Buitrago Salazar, Zarpazo The Bandit: Memoirs of an 
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